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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : CaseNo.20010087-CA 
Priority No. 2 
RICHARD JAIME YANEZ, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Discharging a 
Firearm from a Vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
508 (Supp. 2000), one count of Tampering with a Witness, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c) (Supp. 2000), and one count of Possession 
of a Firearm by a Restricted Person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-503 (Supp. 2000), in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Judith S. Atherton, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). See Addendum A (Judgment and 
Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the State must establish that an investigation or proceeding is officially 
underway to support a conviction of witness tampering under subsection (2)(c) of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-508. 
Standard of Review: "Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law 
which we review for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court's 
interpretation." State v. Lindsay, 2001 UT App 379, f4, 18 P.3d 504 (citation omitted). 
II. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it misinstructed the jury 
that it need not find that an official proceeding or investigation was underway in order to 
convict Yanez of witness tampering. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision concerning jury instructions presents a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Stringhamu 2001 UT App 13, f^l 1, 
17P.3d 1153. 
III. Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of witness 
tampering, discharge of a firearm, or possession of a firearm by a restricted individual. 
Standard of Review: "When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a 
criminal jury trial, we begin with the threshold issue of statutory interpretation, which we 
decide as a matter of law. With regard to the facts, 'we review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury.' Under this standard, we will reverse a conviction only when the 
evidence, viewed in light of our interpretation of the statute, 'is sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'" State v. Fisher, 972 
P.2d 90, 97 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
IV. Whether the offenses of witness tampering and discharge of a firearm merged 
where both charges were based on the act of discharging a firearm. 
2 
Standard of Review: Merger "is essentially an issue of statutory construction that 
we review for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court." State v. 
Mecham. 2000 UT App 247,120, 9 P.3d 777. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Jaime Yanez's ("Yanez") challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
concerning the witness tampering charge is preserved on the record for appeal ("R.") at 
110-18, 183[169, 211]. 
Defense counsel below did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
underlying the convictions for discharge of a firearm and possession of a firearm by a 
restricted individual, although he argued the same to the jury during his closing argument. 
R. 183 [194-96]. "[A]s a general rule, a defendant must raise [a challenge to] the 
sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or objection to preserve the issue for 
appeal." State v. Hokate. 2000 UT 74, Tfl6, 10 P.3d 346. However, this issue is 
reviewable for the first time on appeal because (1) Appellant is represented by new 
counsel, and (2) the record is adequate for review.1 See State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 40 
(Utah 1996) (citing State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)). 
Defense counsel similarly failed to argue that the trial court misinstructed the jury 
1
 A record is adequate for review for purposes of a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel "if the trial record is adequate to permit decision of the issue." Humphries. 
818 P.2d at 1029. There is ample information in the record of the case at bar to 
determine the sufficiency issue presented on appeal. See infra Point B-C. Hence, a Rule 
23B motion to remand is not requested nor necessary to determine Williams's ineffective 
assistance claim. See Utah R. App. P. 23B (2001). 
3 
when it determined that the State need not establish that an actual investigation or 
proceeding was underway in order to prove witness tampering and gave an instruction to 
that effect. However, this issue is also reviewable for the first time on appeal because (1) 
Appellant is represented by new counsel, and (2) the record is adequate for review. See 
Hovater.914P.2dat40. 
Yanez's merger argument is preserved on the record for appeal at R. 183[171-72]. 
His argument that the charge of tampering with a witness requires that an official 
investigation be in place in order to convict is preserved at R. 110-18,183 [169-70,211-
12]. 
STATUTES 
The following statutes are determinative of the issues on appeal. Their text is 
provided in full in Addendum B: 
Tampering with a Witness, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (Supp. 2000); 
Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted Individual, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-503 (Supp. 2000); 
Discharge of Firearm in Direction of any Person or Vehicle, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2000); 
Separate Offenses Arising Out of Single Criminal Episode - Included 
Offenses, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Yanez was charged by an amended information with one count of discharge of a 
4 
firearm from a vehicle "• "» HI* dun (ion i n< IMIIIIII ui * rhn li1 m llimll ulnni'i IdoiiM. in 
ation of Utah Code \nn. ; 7;»-10-5085 one count of possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person, a i*uu. degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503, and 
UN' i mm! n( l.iiiiprnm' \\ iiili .i n Hue1.1, .i lliiiinl tletit'a; IUMIIN . in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c). R.65-67. An arrest warrant was issuei 1. 
Yancz pled not guilty to the charges and the case went to trial. R.36-37,72-
i. .:«_ *.,..;.,, u .ed me sutticiency of the evidence underlying the witness 
Ldinpcuii^ h, * ' »' • I line li Mi mi mi niil 1* nil lln iiiiiiili in inidi i ..nil istinenl. 
R.183[172]. Yanez made a related motion, post-trial, to arrest the judgment, annnnt? that 
the witness tampering statute required that an investigation be in place at the time of the 
itllhiy i," \t l 1  11 • Il K l H 3 (? I I -1 " | (11 \ en thai m > ionnal investigation was underway, 
x U..V. asserted that there was insufficient eviiltTin i • n till w idiiit '<', lam prnnjj 
Td. 
The trial court denied the motion, asserting that the witness tampering statute 
lequnvs only the Slat" "  , , , , • " ill ih It i in II. nil vii(i(et iiiu'll believed that an in\ estigation 
was underway RJ83[212j . . . .e court accordingly determined dial their was suffn mil 
evidence for the question to go to the juiy I d The court consequently instructed the jury 
I III! ill ilir otTetisc oi \\ iiness lainpering did not requ;^. .-.ic Mate to prove that an official 
proceeding or investigation was underway; but only nrim fti ih ill JIII i in1 estiva dm HI 
proceeding was underway. R.89 (Instruction l\u. . . , . 
Yanez also argued ih,n UK witness tampering charge merged with the IIR 
5 
charge since both charges were based on the act of discharging a firearm. R. 183[171-72]. 
The trial court denied that motion as well. R. 183 [ 172]. 
Yanez was convicted as charged. R. 107-09. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Robert Maestas ("Maestas") testified that on May 9, 2000, at approximately 9:30 
a.m., he was driving his pick-up truck to work along 500 South and 1100 West. 
R. 183 [83]. He saw a young man crouched down near a viaduct that spanned the Jordan 
River. R. 183[83,85]. Maestas noticed that the young man's car, a gold Honda, idled at 
the side of the road. R. 183 [84]. The car was parked on the south side of the street facing 
east. R.183[84]. 
Maestas drove past the man, but then made a u-turn and went back to where the 
man was. R. 183 [84-85]. Maestas thought that the man might need help with an 
emergency or that someone may have fallen in the water. Id. Maestas also testified that 
the young man looked suspicious and was looking around as if to see if anyone was 
watching him. R. 183[83]. As Maestas passed the young man again, he observed that the 
man was spraying graffiti on the viaduct. R. 183[85]. 
According to Maestas, the young man, noticing Maestas, ran to his car and started 
to drive. R. 183[86]. The man initially drove eastbound, but then turned westbound and 
followed Maestas1 truck at a distance. R. 183 [87]. Maestas lost the man, drove back 
towards his house and parked in a neighbor's yard so as to conceal himself. R. 183[88]. 
He sat there for fifteen minutes then decided to proceed to work. Id 
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Maestas testified that he took a different mi it * In n i, H I I < f , i \ 111,1 n 11111111 :• 111 (,, i 11, 
young man ajjai R. 183[89]. I k was driving around 900 West and 900 South when he 
spotted the golaiioiivki [ktiKcu it h »; ot an abandoned house. R.183[92] . He saw the 
same ' mini; in.in i nicrm1 Irnm In liiinl sniiiu !biih.Iic\\ IIHIIIIIIM n .null ihrnmc-plated 
handgun. R. 183[92]. The man pointed at Maestas with his finger 
R.183[93]. He followed Maestas. Id %"-•'^ ><^  hoped n> \mp at a nearby senior center to 
111 mi 1 11nh n i., 11 , I i | I n n I i in i, i" I 111 .• 11 a, o i t n e a a n g e r t h a t t h e m a n m i g h t p r e s e n t t o 
anyone there. R.183[94,io9]. 
The man continued to follow Maestas and was closing in on him quickly. 
. >i-sias feared he man would rear-end him R. 183 [96]. Maestas 
. -. ;;vremptonl> ram the 
^jungman. R.li>j[9o,100j. He was braking -W<AI *. e 
took to be a gunsho: R 183[°" " OF] \;a. >tas laid d ^i. _u the seat of the truck. 
Ik I !vi(l/H | Simultaneously., Maestas looked through a convex wide-angel rearview 
mirror and saw the man hold a y\ i i In1. Ii II kind, IHIIMIII In", t M n lutein \, as lie drove. 
R.183[995108]. He also saw the man's hand recoil two times. R.183[98-*>u. He 
took this to mean that the man fired at him two more times. R. 183 [99] A -. al 1 ot this was 
i II " \\ MJM;S(> Uglified lhi»' 'u 'omul .i pen in ln^  ••liul and copied <Ji-.un ;he man's 
license plate number. iv.*s3|_iU-t,iwoj. 
. Maestas observed the man turn around in his car and drive away. R. 183[ 11III [. He 
In: • ) \ e I K ic V t< »hi: 11 louse and asked a i leighbor tc > call the police R 183 [103]. I le went ' 
into his house and called the police himself. Id He gave a report to Officer Kettering, 
who came to his house that day. R.183[l 10]. In his report, Maestas omitted or included 
information that he did not testify to at trial on direct examination. For example, he did 
not mention that he saw the man with a spray can when he first spotted him at the 
viaduct. R. 183 [112-13]. He also told Kettering that he did not know if the man actually 
fired at him because there were no bullet holes in his truck. R.183[l 13]. He also told the 
officer that he saw the man holding a bag when he spotted him a second time at the 
house, and that the man dropped the bag when he emerged from behind the bushes. 
R.183[113-14]. 
Matthew James Shell ("Shell"), Maestas1 neighbor for twenty years, testified that 
he was riding his bicycle in the vicinity of 900 West and 900 South between 9:00 a.m. 
and 10:00 a.m. on May 9, 2000. R.183[l 18-19]. He noticed a gold Honda parked in 
front of an abandoned house. R.183[l 19-20]. He saw a young man walk out with his left 
hand pointing down. R. 183 [120]. Shell thought the man held a small gun in his left 
hand. R.183[121]. Shell noticed Maestas pass at that moment. R.183[121-22]. He saw 
the man point at Maestas with his right hand, then jump in his car and follow Maestas. 
R. 183 [122]. Maestas and the man were driving fast. R. 183 [122]. Shell followed on his 
bike to see what was happening. R. 183[123]. He heard two or three pops. R. 183[124]. 
Then he heard brakes squealing and tires screeching. R. 183 [124]. Shell was certain that 
the pops he heard were gunshots and could not have been caused by anything else, such 
as firecrackers or a car backfiring. R. 183 [ 125]. 
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^ Shell called the police and gave them .,1 Miimiiiin. vil ;ic ;uiii 1 nil vvh il lie ,• \ 
R. 183 [125,129], He met the investigating officers at the abandoned house where he 
spotted the gold Honda K IN.>| I J:»| I 11 il mis report to the officers, Shell did not mention 
I In- si iva tiiii^ In i i , tiii J In lull! Iln ullii n \ I'LiI In: <. uiiU iiul \)UA nJc a description ol the 
suspect because he did not get a good look at him. R.183[I27-2S| ,\l « 1.1I hmu u'l . 
Shell provided a detailed description of the man, stating that he wore "[k]haki shorts with 
knee lM).'h liihi.' so i l s .:.. : a gray hooded sweatshirt cut off at ilk dhow with the fringes 
left in just strings* I«" 1M \\ 1 '" I I < h n ill l\ 1 irshs null Mi .*. ». tit th = incident 
twice prior to trial R. 183 [ 128-29]. He asserted at trial that he testified to his own 
•rvations on the day of the incident. R.183[130]. 
v v - • *-aii i.^w v <i>
 f)uiia < ilicer, investigated 
the incident. R.183[ij7-J8j. Mie observed t s'V. 
gang painted on the abandoned house. R.183[139,141]. One of the individuals identified 
himself as "Sleepy,," who Howell knew as the Appellant,, Mr. Yanez. R.183[141]. The 
oilier Avenues %u\\\i member id'/ulilied ;is ' 1 mulie,'" win1, ,111 individual named Ernesto 
Martinez. JUL 
Howell assembled a photo array consisting of pictures of Yanez, Martinez, and 
I'M f UIIII.T 1  in lit* html pcupli V I ii \\ I I I I '" | "Mie showed the array to Maestas, who 
eliminated all but two of the photos and then identified Y; *'»•. 
142-411 I loue r '- . " 1 .-AhuuM- R 1K3| 143]. She observed a gold I londa 
1 .;i»n- v , . ;u ibc plate number similar to the one provided by Maestas. Id. 
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On May 12, 2000, Yanez was stopped by officers in his car. R. 183 [145]. Howell 
spoke to Yanez in her patrol car. Id She informed him that he was a suspect. Id Yanez 
admitted spraying graffiti on the viaduct and house on May 9, 2000. R. 183 [146]. He 
also said that he saw Maestas at the viaduct and watched as he made a u-turn. 
R. 183 [147]. Yanez said he did not pay much attention to Maestas and drove off himself. 
Id. He also said that he may have motioned with his hand or flipped Maestas off while at 
the bridge, but that he could not remember. Id. 
Yanez explained that he saw Maestas a second time at the abandoned house. Id. 
He told Howell that he held a can of spray paint with a chrome bottom as he walked away 
from the house. R. 183 [148]. Yanez explained that he drove off in the same direction as 
Maestas on his way home, following him to the area of 900 West and 900 South. Id. 
Yanez said he turned south, while Maestas drove north. Id. Yanez denied having a gun 
or shooting at Maestas. R. 183 [149]. He told Howell that the spray can could have been 
mistaken for a gun. Id No gun or shell casings were found in Yanez's car when it was 
searched on May 12,2000. R.183[156-57]. 
Howell also investigated the area of the alleged shooting on May 14, 2000. R.183 
[156-57]. Although it is not unusual to find remaining casings a few days after a 
shooting, she did not find any casings or gun in this instance. R.183[156,160-61]. 
Howell explained that the casings would have ejected to the right of the gun as it was 
fired. R.183 [159]. Since the gun was allegedly held in the suspect's left hand as he 
drove, they could have fallen into his car or lodged in the windshield. R.183 [159]. 
10 
. Howell did not receive any reports ol mm fin. Irnni \\w ml (In iir i itMtlaii1-
11
 ough many people li* c ii. :hv vinnil) R. 183[156]. She testified that residents of 
h^u « .c alleged Miooting occurred, normally report gunfire fifty percent of 
the time, • * . . omMaestas 
and Shell. R.183[156]. Howell stated that Shell called at Maestas'1 equest Id 
Antonio Yanez, Yanez's father, testified that Yanez was in a motorcycle accident 
111 Se(i-1e111be», 1 *""' L I n i 11 u I 11 ) ronsequently, \ anez had to have surgery on his 
right arm in May, 2000, which left hun in >» " " Id ' V ' 'I'^ l ^ T innni i»< I m l\| M 
2000 TL Howell • estifled ihai Yane/ did not have any noticeable problem with his arm 
w1 i sne interviewed lum wii Niav Kl, 2000. R.183H'7J^ I k was not wearing a cast, 
•o * .*• '.su/ ;^-u: i»vt heheldthe 
4)ra> can in his leti hand v\hen he was at the abandoned house K^ M 781 <<> ^ j 
explained that sh; Jul ynt ask Yanez specific questions about his heaL„, _ ~&ii ^  ~*v* 
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SUMMARY OF I'HEARiailVILNI' 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in misconstruing subsection (2)(c) of the 
w itness tampering statute and concluding that the State need not prove an at 
investi • .sh that OIK ^ v *J court 
similarly erred as a matter of law when it misinstructeel (lit | I 11 v 11 u I 11 11 r n I n 111 y 111111111,11 
Yanez had a subjective belief that an investigation or criminal proceeding was under w a;y 
; < .\ \ ioreover, the convictions for witness tampering, possession 
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of a firearm by a restricted person, and discharge of a firearm from a vehicle toward a 
person or another vehicle fail for insufficient evidence. Finally, the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in failing to merge the offenses of witness tampering and discharge of a 
firearm from a vehicle at a person or another vehicle where both offenses were 
established by the same evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE IS REQUIRED TO PROVE THAT THERE WAS AN 
ACTUAL INVESTIGATION OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IN PLACE 
IN ORDER TO PROSECUTE UNDER SUBSECTION (2YQ OF THE 
WITNESS TAMPERING STATUTE. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in misconstruing subsection (2)(c) of the 
witness tampering statute and concluding that the State need not prove an actual 
investigation or criminal proceeding in order to establish that offense. See Arndt v. First 
Interstate Bank of Utah, N A . 1999 UT 91,1fl0, 991 P.2d 584; State v. Lindsay, 2001 UT 
App 379, Tf4, 18 P.3d 504 (reviewing trial court's statutory construction for correctness). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a court may go beyond the plain language of a 
statutory provision only if the language of such provision is unclear. See Arndt, 1999 UT 
91 at^lO. 
"A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be 
construed according to their plain language." O'Keefe v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998). "Only //the language of a 
statute is ambiguous do we resort to other modes of construction." Id. One 
such mode is reading the statute "in harmony with other statutes under the 
same and related chapters" and "rely[ing] on the plain language of [those 
related] statutes [in which] no ambiguity exists." Bonham v. Morgan, 788 
P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989); see also Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 
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644 (Utah 1993); Provo City Corp \ Mate. 795 V ,M 1 I "I , I i " ' I H.ih 
. , emphasis uducd): see also C.T. v. Johnson. 19991 IT 35,1J9, 977 P.2d 479 ( "'[w ]e 
- * • • .. it i I advisedlj " and gi\ e effect to each term 
according to its ordinary and accepted meanirM""" «'uuoiaiion omitti J t 
"
r
 •: u si ihstantiv c terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation 
» .\. : .... language used, and [the court has] no power to rewrite the statute to 
conftv intention i^pivsscd1 1 1 <i|iiohng Berrett v. Purset <x KUWUIU:^  r^  u 
P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994)). Under these principles of statutory constructioii, the trial 
coi irt erred in interpreting subsection (2)(c) to include an element concerning Yanez's 
bLTieliihunl.il ii >estigatiut . .. .^ .auin r . 5ec id. 
The language of subset is.--." 
elements from, subsection <'{ »is inappi
 ± .... .aid unwarranted. See AWM^, I,JJ ^ ± JI 
11 1| 111 Subsection (2)(c) clearly states: 
... :• ,\ per- -,i • • •. LMCC ielwn\ if lie: (c) communicates to 
u person a ;, ? \> r< t -. \ >uiiauic person would believe to be a threat to do 
kiJ\ injui \ c<v,
 r , i i, because of my act performed or to be 
performed h\ the person in his eapaeit} as a witness or informant in an 
official proceeding or investigation 
Ul.ilM ode /\iiii i" Zip K O^KUHv Ii I In. critical language at issue here positively states 
that the person to whom the threat is directed must be n "wilnt'ss' i nil' i m.ml in .m 
official proceeding or investigaiion " k^ » he text is noticeably lacking the word 
" poien .: i)c i OR. v ;tness or i^f^rmant." thereby precluding the inclusion of the 
subjective belief element of subsection (1). See id Hence, the wording of the statute 
implies that an official investigation or proceeding has been instituted against the suspect 
at the time of the alleged offense because one cannot be a "witness or informant" 
otherwise. kL; see Johnson, 1999 UT 35 at f ) (presuming that legislature used terms 
advisedly and refusing to "'infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. 
Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used1") (citation omitted). 
The trial court's reliance upon State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985), in 
importing the subjective belief element is, therefore, misplaced. R. 183 [212]. First, 
Bradley was decided under subsection (1) of the witness tampering statute and holds that 
the State only need show that "defendant believe[d] an official proceeding or 
investigation be underway" when prosecuting thereunder. Id. at 876-77 (emphasis 
original); see also State v. Tolman. 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah App. 1989) (relying on 
Bradley in holding that 76-8-508(1) does not require proof that an official investigation or 
proceeding was pending). Bradley and Tolman are distinguishable because they were 
decided under subsection (1), a discreet and separate provision from subsection (2)(c). 
Hence, the application of Bradley by the trial court below is misplaced. 
In addition, importing the subjective belief element controverts the goal of 
statutory construction, which is to give effect to legislative intent, most clearly expressed 
in the plain language of a statute. 
"This court's primary objective in construing enactments is to give effect to 
the legislature's intent." Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1996). 
"'When examining a statute, we look first to its plain language as the best 
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indicator of the legislature's inient and purpose ... ,-,* .^i.^ UK statuu 
1 lolmes v. American States li^ Co., 1 P.3d 552, 2000 UT App 85.1, 
quoting Wilson v. Vallex Menial Health. 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998)). 
•vlore, "where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do 
not look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine legislative intent " 
Horton v. Roval Order of the Sun. K l^ !\2<! M ^ * 168 (Utah 1991). 
I indsay. 2001 Ul App -79 atf5: see .-.U- SUU .. , ..a;,. " i \ | T '. ' y ' " 
P.3d 400. Since the plain language of subsection (2)(c) clearly contemplates that an 
official proceeding or investigation be underway, that is the intent of the legislature. See 
1 iitd'ut\. 'on I (III tp|i l To-H l^ i Jolano, iv-ii., ;ie trial court 
below erred in not implementing it in Yanez's case. 
The trial court's erroneous interpretation of subsection (2)(c) raises the added 
;: oi ice i i I that Yanez's constitutional right to be apprised of the charges against him was 
violated. See Utah. Const. Article 1 11 l ' i m ibu) '.t> ill l« •>• dM * I i i ,|i> .mdthe 
ilature and cause of the accusation against him, [and' to have a copy thercui f K i. § 
• jl lenses shall be prosecuted by informant''V T T S. Const, amend 
("accused Jul! i'ii|u'i (Li n^hl I -In; iitlorined of the nature and cause of the 
accusation1'); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 4(a) ("nil irtffnis.cs SJIJIII IK pm^o men m . . 
information"). Yane/ was charued by information under subsection (2)(c) of the witness 
• a-, I.J. *'. .- liiloniiali'ii'iil \\ 'hen the court changed the elements 
of the charge that was set forth in ilin liilmiiMimii in HUH hnir ilir siiliieeiiu in/liel element, 
it compromised Yanez's ability to present a vigorous defense because the State was 
essentially permitted to meet its burden of proof by proving one less element than is 
15 
required under subsection (2)(c), to wit, an actual investigation or proceeding underway 
at the time of the offense. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred as a matter of law in misconstruing 
subsection (2)(c) of the witness tampering statute and determining that the State need not 
show that an investigation or proceeding was underway at the time that Yanez allegedly 
tampered with a witness. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-503(2)(c); Lindsay, 2001 UT App 
379 at 1J4. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT 
MISINSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS OF WITNESS 
TAMPERING. 
As a related matter, the trial court erred as a matter of law in instructing the jury 
based on its faulty conclusion that the State need not prove an actual investigation or 
proceeding to prosecute under subsection (2)(c). See State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 
(Utah 1991); U.S. Const, amends. V & XIV (due process); Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (same). 
As noted above, the court imported an element that is not included in subsection (2)(c). 
Yanez was charged and prosecuted under subsection (2)(c) of the witness tampering 
statute, codified at section 76-8-508. R.66 (Amended Information); 88 (Jury Instruction 
No. 10 relating offense of witnessing tampering consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
508(2)(c)). Subsection (2)(c) of the witness tampering statute provides in relevant part: 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he : . . . (c) communicates to 
a person a threat that a reasonable person would believe to be a threat to do 
bodily injury to the person, because of any act performed or to be 
performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or informant in an 
official proceeding or investigation. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c). 
Section 76-8-508(1) provides a separate basis for convicting a person of witness 
tampering: 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts 
to induce or otherwise cause a person to: (a) testify or inform falsely; (b) 
withhold any testimony, information, document, item; (c) elude legal 
process summoning him to provide evidence; or (d) absent himself from 
any proceeding or investigation to which he has bee summoned. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1) ("subsection (1)"). Subsection (1) was not charged in 
Yanez's case. See generally R.66 (Amended Information). 
The trial court in the present case gave two instructions regarding witness 
tampering. Instruction Number 10 laid out the elements of the offense as described in 
subsection (2)(c). R.66. The court added Instruction Number 11, which quoted language 
from subsection (1) and provided: 
You are hereby instructed that the offense of Tampering with a Witness, as 
charged in Count II of the Information, does not require the State to prove 
that an "official proceeding or investigation" was underway, but only that 
defendant believed that an "official proceeding or investigation" was 
underway. 
R.89. The trial court gave Instruction 11 based on its decision concerning a motion made 
by Yanez to dismiss the witness tampering charge for insufficient evidence where the 
State failed to produce any evidence that Maestas was a witness or an informant in an 
investigation or proceeding instituted against Yanez at the time of the offense. 
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R. 183[169,211].2 The State argued Instruction Number 11 to the jury during its closing 
argument. R. 183[205]. 
This set of instructions constitutes reversible legal error because it does not 
accurately or fairly relate the elements of witness tampering under subsection (2)(c). See 
Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
The jury must be instructed with respect to all the legal elements that it 
must find to convict of the crime charged, and the absence of such an 
instruction is reversible error as a matter of law "The general rule is 
that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is 
essential. Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error."... Thus, the 
failure to give this instruction can never be harmless error. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
As discussed supra Point I. A., the elements of the version of witness tampering 
that Yanez was charged with are: 
(1) "communicating] to [Maestas] a threat to do bodily injury to [him]" 
(2) "because of any act performed or about to be performed by [Maestas] in 
his capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or 
investigation." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c). This section of the witness tampering statute, by its 
plain and express terms, does not contemplate the subjective belief element that is added 
in Instruction Number 11, R.89. See supra Point I; Arndt, 1999 UT 91 at ^10. Hence, 
the trial court did not give "fan accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an 
2
 Yanez made a related motion to arrest judgment post trial, adding that there was 
insufficient evidence that Yanez believed that an investigation or official proceeding was 
underway. R. 110-18 (Written Motion); R. 183[223-24] (Oral Motion). 
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offense.'" Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061 (citation omitted). The court's "'[fjailure to so instruct 
constitutes reversible error.'" IdL 
Since the court's instruction does not accurately or fairly represent the elements of 
robbery under subsection (l)(a), "it is impossible . . . to determine or presume that the 
jury properly performed its weighing function." State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 
1989). In fact, under Instructions Number 10 and 11, the jury's deliberations were so far 
skewed that they were misdirected into finding the subjective belief element although it is 
directly contrary to the language of subsection (2)(c). State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 
609 (Utah App. 1998). Hence, the instruction only served to "confuse rather than 
enlighten the jury, since it concerns terms" that are not part of subsection (2)(c). 
Accordingly, Anderson's case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. See 
Jones. 823 P.2d at 106 L3 
3
 The United States Supreme Court recently held that a new trial is not required in 
cases where the trial judge failed to instruct on an element of the crime because the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Neder v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 
1830, 527 U.S. 1, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). 
Neder does not affect the long-standing rule in Utah that failure to accurately 
instruct on all of the elements in a criminal case can never be harmless. See Jones, 823 
P.2d at 1061. First, Utah appellate courts are not required to apply federal standards of 
review when presented with challenges to trial court determinations made under federal 
law. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265 (Utah 1993). Rather, this Court is 
required to follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court authority and conclude that 
harmless error review is inappropriate since failure to accurately instruct a jury requires 
reversal as a matter of law. See State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980); State v. 
Harmon, 712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986) (Utah Supreme Court refuses State's request to 
conduct harmless error review where trial court failed to instruct on elements of crime). 
Additionally, the error in this case involves a violation of not only federal due 
process, but also of state due process. See U.S. Const, amends. V & XIV; Utah Const. 
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As a final matter, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to 
challenge the instructions given by the court. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 
668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984). The Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution guarantees "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to . . . have the [assistance of counsel for his defence.11 See also Utah 
Const, art. I, § 12 (guaranteeing the right to the presence of an attorney). 
"To demonstrate constitutionally ineffective representation, a defendant must 
establish that (1) his counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and (2) but for his counsel's deficient performance, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." State v. 
Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688; State v. 
Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990)). 
In assessing counsel's performance, there is a presumption that he or she "rendered 
adequate assistance." Tavlor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995). Moreover, 
counsel's actions are not questioned unless there is no possible tactical explanation. IcL 
As to prejudice, the United States Supreme Court in Strickland noted, "reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 466 U.S. 
at 694. Furthermore, prejudice is assessed in light of "the totality of the evidence," taking 
into account such factors as whether the errors affect the "entire evidentiary picture" or 
Art. I, § 7. Utah is free to apply an independent standard under the Utah Constitution and 
continue finding that such violations require reversal as a matter of law. 
20 
have an "isolated, trivial effect" and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record. 
Id at 695-96. 
Under the foregoing, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
instructions. See Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688, 694. First, counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. IdL at 688. As noted above, Utah case 
law clearly holds that "[t]he jury must be instructed with respect to all the legal elements 
that it must find to convict of the crime changed.. . . [A]n accurate instruction upon the 
basic elements of an offense is essential." Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061. Moreover, "[fjailure 
to so instruct constitutes reversible error." Id. Hence, it was not objectively reasonable 
for defense counsel to fail to challenge the submission of Instruction 11, which 
erroneously added the subjective belief element that is not a part of the offense as set 
forth in subsection (2)(c). For the same reasons, there can be no tactical explanation for 
failing to ensure that the jury was properly instructed regarding the offense. See Taylor. 
905 P.2d at 282. If anything, the clear mandate that a jury must be properly instructed 
obliges counsel to be extra diligent in reviewing and correcting instructional errors that 
arise. 
In addition, counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial to Yanez. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In light of the totality of the evidence, the jury would not 
have convicted Yanez of witness tampering because there was no evidence that an 
investigation or proceeding was underway at the time of the alleged offense. See infra 
Point III.B. (discussing insufficiency of evidence). If properly instructed, the jury would 
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have performed its duty to establish whether the evidence supported the charge and, 
consequently, would have duly acquitted Yanez. Absent a proper and accurate 
instruction, Yanez's right to due process and a trial by a jury was violated since it was 
misinformed. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV (due process); Utah Const, art. I, §§ 10 (right 
to jury) & 12 (due process). Accordingly, "confidence in the outcome" of trial is 
undermined and, therefore, "there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different." Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694. 
III. YANEZ'S CONVICTIONS FAIL FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
A. Defense Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Challenge the 
Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying the Charges of Possession of a 
Firearm by a Restricted Person and Discharge of a Firearm from a Vehicle 
Where the Charges Fail for Insufficient Evidence. 
Defense counsel below did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
underlying the convictions for discharge of a firearm and possession of a firearm by a 
restricted individual, see generally R.183, although he argued the same to the jury during 
his closing argument. R.183 [194-96]. Failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance 
of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
Under the criteria set forth supra Point II concerning ineffective assistance, 
defense counsel's failure to challenged the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the 
charges of possession of a firearm by a restricted person and discharge of a firearm from 
a vehicle violated Yanezfs Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 
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because it does not meet an "'objective standard of reasonableness,'" and it prejudiced the 
outcome of his trial. Hovater, 914 P.2d at 39 (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688); U.S. 
Const, amend. VI. 
First, defense counsel's omission falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness given the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
10 P.3d 346, which holds, "a defendant must raise [a challenge to] the sufficiency of the 
evidence by proper motion or objection to preserve the issue for appeal." Ld. at [^16. 
Holgate is a published decision that was handed down on September 19, 2000, a month 
before Yanez's trial on October 18-19, 2000. R.72-73,183 (noting trial date). Hence, 
defense counsel was charged with knowledge of the case and his duty thereunder to 
preserve any sufficiency argument on the record. See, e.g.. Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 
P.2d 193, 194 n.3 (Utah App. 1993) (counsel should have been aware of published 
opinion affecting client, even if undelivered, since appellate court routinely makes 
advance sheets available for review by attorneys in general). 
Moreover, there is no conceivable tactical explanation for omitting to raise the 
challenge such that the presumption of adequate assistance of counsel survives in this 
case. See Taylor, 905 P.2d at 282. There was no risk of unduly drawing the jury's 
attention to potentially damaging issues and facts underlying the challenge since such a 
motion can and is routinely made outside the jury's presence. 
In fact, defense counsel actually presented the argument to the jury in his closing 
argument, which establishes that he was aware of the evidentiary weaknesses in the 
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State's case, and negates any possible tactical rationale for not making the sufficiency 
argument to the court. R. 183 [194-95]. Specifically, defense counsel stated in closing: 
There was no gun recovered. There was no evidence of any shell casings. 
There was no call from an outside source in the area that anyone heard 
shots being fired. 
The officer testified not always does that happen, 50-50 chance that 
someone would call and report it in that neighborhood. But any inferences 
that are drawn in this case have to be drawn in favor of the defendant. 
There were no shell casings found. The officer did go twice to look for 
them, didn't find anything. Didn't find anything because there was no gun, 
there was no shell casing. He wouldn't have investigated it if there was no 
hope of ever finding one. That's why he went back. He testified he went 
back to it because sometimes in cases they find shell casings, they find 
discarded weapons. That's why he went back and looked for it. They 
weren't found, and the inferences have to be drawn in favor of the 
defendant. 
I would suggest that, as you go through these jury instructions and you 
look at the charge of discharge of a firearm from and vehicle and you look 
at element No.4, the State has to prove that Mr. Yanez did discharge a 
firearm. I don't think that they can prove that beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We've got just one person's strained testimony that that happened. 
There's no other corroborating evidence. Any inferences have to be drawn 
in favor of the defendant. He's not guilty unless proven so beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
As you look at the instruction on whether Mr. Yanez was guilty of the 
offense of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, again, as you look 
at element No. 4,1 would suggest that the State did not prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Yanez possessed, used or had under his custody 
and control any firearm. None was ever found. 
R. 183 [193-95]. In light of Holgate and defense counsel's articulation of the sufficiency 
argument to the jury, the first prong of Strickland is met, i.e., "counsel's performance was 
so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland. 466 
U.S. at 688. 
In addition, Yanez's right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
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Amendment was violated because, "but for his counsel's deficient performance, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; U.S. Const, amend. VI. Under the totality of the evidence 
presented in this case, there is a "reasonable probability" that a sufficiency challenge 
would succeed and, hence, there "is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see infra Point II.B. (discussing insufficiency 
of evidence underlying convictions for possession of a firearm by a restricted person and 
discharge of a firearm from a vehicle at a person or vehicle). 
B. Yanez's Convictions for Witness Tampering. Possession of a Firearm by 
a Restricted Person, and Discharge of a Firearm from a Vehicle Fail for 
Insufficient Evidence. 
In order to sustain a conviction for witness tampering, the State has to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(1) Yanez "communicate[d] to a person a threat that a reasonable person 
would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of 
any act performed or to be performed by the person in his capacity as a 
witness or informant in an official proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c). 
To establish possession of a firearm by a restricted person, the State has to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements: 
(1) That Yanez, "within the last seven years has been adjudicated 
delinquent for an offense which if committed by an adult would have been 
a felony;" 
(2) and that he "purchasefd], transferred], possesse[d], used[d], or ha[d] 
under his custody or control... any firearm." 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(l)(b)(ii) & -(3)(a) (Supp. 2000). 
Likewise, to support the conviction for discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, the 
State had to establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(1) That Yanez "discharge[d] [a ] . . . firearm . .. from an automobile;" 
(2) and that he did so "in the direction of any person or persons, knowing or 
having reason to believe that any person may be endangered;" 
or 
"with intent to intimidate or harass another, [Yanez] discharge[d] a firearm 
in the direction of any vehicle." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(l)(a)(i), -(2)(a), & -(2)(c). 
The evidence, fully marshalled in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,4 is as 
follows: 
- Maestas saw Yanez crouching near a viaduct around 500 South and 1100 West 
as he drove past in his truck. R.183[83,85]. He saw the man's gold Honda idling at the 
side of the road. R. 183 [84]. Maestas thought the man might need help so he made a u-
turn and returned to the viaduct. R. 183 [84-85]. As he approached, he observed the man 
spraying graffiti on the viaduct. R. 183 [85]. 
- Maestas said the man saw him, ran to his car and started to follow him at a 
4
 "It is well established that a defendant's burden on appeal when challenging 
the sufficiency of the evidence after a jury trial is to "marshal the evidence in support of 
the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict."" State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155,^18, 3 P.3d 192 
(citations omitted). 
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distance. R. 183[86-87]. Maestas lost the man, drove towards his neighborhood, and 
parked in a neighbor's yard for fifteen minutes to conceal himself. R. 183[88]. He then 
proceeded to work again, taking a different route so as not to run into the man again. 
R.183[88-89]. 
- Maestas drove by an abandoned house around 900 South and 900 West and saw 
the man's gold Honda again. R. 183 [92]. He observed Yanez emerge from behind some 
bushes in front of the house holding a small chrome-plated handgun. R. 183 [92]. 
- Maestas alleged that he heard a "pop," which he took to be a gunshot. 
R. 183 [97,108]. He crouched down in the seat of his truck and looked at Yanez through 
his wide-angle, convex rearview mirror. R. 183 [97-99,108]. He saw Yanez point a gun 
out of the driver's side window, held in his left hand. R. 183 [96-97,108]. He saw Yanez's 
hand recoil two times, which he also understood to be gunshots. R. 183[98-99,108]. 
- Shell, who happened to be riding his bike by the abandoned house at the same 
time, also testified that he saw a man walking away from the house holding what 
appeared to be a small silver gun in his left hand, pointing down. R. 183[120-21]. He 
said he saw the man point his right index finger at Maestas as Maestas drove by in his 
truck. R.183[121-22]. R.183[120-21]. He observed Yanez get into his car and follow 
Maestas. R. 183[122]. He heard two "pops" from the direction in which the men drove. 
R. 183 [124]. He testified that the "pops" sounded like gunshots. Id. He then heard tires 
screeching and brakes squealing. Id. 
- Yanez stipulated that he was "adjudicated delinquent [in 1997] for an offense 
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which if committed by an adult would have been a felony." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503(l)(b);R.183[161-62]. 
- Yanez did not contest that he was spray painting graffiti on the viaduct and at the 
abandoned house when Maestas drove by. R. 183[146-47]. He also admitted to Officer 
Howell that he either flipped Maestas off or motioned with his hand as he passed when 
they were at the viaduct. Id Finally, Yanez also told Officer Howell that he followed 
Maestas in his car as he drove away from both the viaduct and the house, although he was 
not following him to harass him. R. 183 [ 147-148]. 
Such evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, is 
insufficient to support the guilty verdicts rendered against Yanez, because it "is so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element." State v. Hoffhine, 
2001 UT 4,1J20, 413 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (citation omitted) (noting that trial court's denial 
of motion to arrest judgment is reviewed under same standard applied to motions for 
insufficient evidence). 
As an initial matter, the evidence going to whether Yanez actually fired a gun is 
speculative at best since no gun or shell casings were located in the area of the alleged 
incident or in his car, R.183[156-57], no bullet holes were in Maestas1 truck, R.183[l 13], 
and none of the residents nearby reported any gunfire. R. 183 [156]. The absence of this 
sort of key evidence linking a defendant to a gun-related offense is necessary under Utah 
case law in order for the convictions to survive a sufficiency challenge. 
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For example, in State v. Gonzales. 2000 UT App 136, 2 P.3d 954, this Court 
reversed a conviction for tampering with evidence, to wit, a gun used in a drive-by 
shooting. Id. at <[fl|3,17-18. The defendant in that case was riding in the back seat of a car 
with three other individuals. Id. at 1}3. The driver, "using a semi-automatic pistol, shot 
several rounds out of the driver's side window at the other car" and then "tossed the gun 
in the glove compartment." Id. at 1fi|3-4. When the police stopped the vehicle, they 
searched the glove compartment but did not find the gun. Id. at 1fi|5-6. The gun was 
eventually found behind the glove box. Ld. at Tf6. "[A]n ammunition clip, identical to the 
one eventually found in the gun, [was found] in defendant's pocket." Id At trial, one of 
the car's occupants testified that the driver put the gun in the glove compartment and that 
defendant did nothing to hide the gun. Id. at f7. The State did not dispute that defendant, 
sitting in the backseat, could not have assisted the driver in stashing the gun. Id. at [^17. 
Accordingly, this Court reversed the conviction for evidence tampering because 
the inference between defendant's possession of an identical clip and the hiding of the 
gun actually used in the shooting was too speculative. Id. at ^ [17-18. The mere 
possession of a similar clip did not support the inference that the gun belonged to 
defendant, that he gave it to the driver to use in the shooting, that he encouraged the 
driver to hide it, or that he took the clip out of the gun believing an investigation was 
imminent.5 The Court stated, "it is just as possible, absent any evidence presented by the 
5
 Evidence tampering, as charged in Gonzales, unlike subsection (2)(c) of the 
witness tampering statute, included the subjective belief of a defendant regarding an 
29 
State, that he had the clip in his pocket all evening. Thus, by merely establishing 
defendant's possession of the extra clip, the State did not present sufficient evidence from 
which the jury could infer [evidence tampering.]" Id at f 18; see, e.g. State v. Eberwein. 
2001 UT App 71 ffljl4-17, 23 P.3d 1139 (reversing conviction for driving while under the 
influence of controlled substance; defendant admitted that prescription pills were his and 
that he ingested them, but State's assertion that they were "controlled substance" was 
speculative where evidence did not produce evidence of identifying chemical tests or 
arresting officer's qualification to identify substance). 
Conversely, this Court has upheld gun-related offenses only where the weapon 
was actually located and evidence strongly supported the inference that the defendant was 
in possession of it or used it. For instance, in State v. Rivera. 906 P.2d 318 (Utah App. 
1995), rev'd on other grounds. 943 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1997), this Court upheld a bindover 
order for a charge of possession of a gun by a restricted person where the gun was "found 
in [the] truck [that defendant drove] upon his arrest." Id at 319. Although the truck 
belonged to another person, defendant had "exclusive possession of the truck at the time 
that the gun was discovered" and the truck's owner did not own the type of gun that was 
found. Id at 320. The truck owner's son owned such a gun, but he was in possession of 
it at the time of the robbery. Id. Moreover, while defendant's girlfriend may have owned 
the gun, it was under defendant's control, and there was evidence that defendant 
investigation as an element of the crime. See Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136 at ffl[l 1,18. 
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attempted to return to the truck and retrieve the weapon when he was fleeing the police. 
Id. "There was also evidence that a Hispanic man robbed the victim by threatening the 
use of a handgun. The police apprehended defendant^ a Hispanic man] a short time later, 
not far from the [scene of the robbery], driving a truck in which a handgun was found." 
Id; see also State v. Gum 904 P.2d 238, 242 (Utah App. 1995) (upholding conviction for 
possession of firearm by restricted person where gun found in defendant's possession, he 
admitted that he knew they were in trailer where they were discovered by police, 
defendant was sole resident of trailer although others stopped by there for coffee breaks 
and to make phone calls); see, e.g., Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4 at [^21 (upholding conviction for 
aggravated robbery where "victim told police that the robber brandished a gun, and police 
found lead pellets from a pellet gun in the front passenger seat of the car," car matched 
victim's description and defendant was only person in car). 
Given that the State produced no gun, shell casings, bullet holes, reports of 
gunfire, or any other compelling evidence that Yanez owned a gun or fired one at 
Maestas, his convictions for possession of a firearm by a restricted person, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-503, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508, or 
witness tampering viz-a-vis firing at Maestas, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c), fail for 
insufficient evidence. The leap between Maestas1 and Shell's testimony, who only heard 
what they thought were shots, and these charges is too "remote [and] speculative" to 
support the guilty verdicts. Eberwein. 2001 UT App 71 at [^14. 
Moreover, the residual evidence presented by the State is not so compelling as to 
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bolster Maestas1 allegations. If anything, it is inconclusive and improbable such that the 
jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to all the charges. See Hofifhine, 2001 
UT 4 at 1}20 (trial court may arrest jury verdict when evidence is "'so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable .. . that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt1") (quotation omitted). First, Maestas testified that he was shaken up and angered 
by this incident. R.183[105,l 11]. As noted in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), 
the fear, excitement, adrenaline and startling quality associated with an encounter such as 
this inhibits an individual's ability to accurately perceive and recall details of the event 
that later prove to be critical at a court proceeding.6 Id. at 487-92. 
Undoubtedly, Maestas was alarmed when he passed Yanez at the viaduct and then 
saw him get in his car and follow Maestas' truck. R. 183 [86]. Given that he had just 
observed Yanez spraying graffiti on the viaduct, a crime, Maestas testified that he 
believed Yanez was pursuing him out of anger. R. 183 [88]. The fact that Maestas 
intentionally lost Yanez and hid out in his neighborhood for fifteen minutes, and then 
took a circuitous route to work to avoid running into him again, indicates that he sensed 
danger. R.183[88]. 
In this frame of mind, Maestas' subsequent observation of a gun and gunfire is a 
highly suspect and unreliable product of his fear, alarm, anxiety and adrenaline. See 
Long, 721 P.2d at 487-92. Maestas stated that he saw Yanez with a gun in hand when he 
6
 The jury was given a Long instruction warning of the inherent weaknesses of 
eyewitness identifications. R.94-97 (Instruction No. 16). 
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spotted him a second time at the abandoned house spraying graffiti agaii 183[92]. it 
follows under these circumstances that, in the split second that he observed Yanez as he 
drove past, he would assume the glint of Yanez's shiny metal-bottomed spray paint can, 
held in his left hand, was a gun. R.I83[92,148,178]. 
Maestas' potential for distorting critical details only became amplified as the 
situation escalated when Yanez followed him once again and Maestas allegedly heard a 
muffled "pop." which he took to be gunfire, and he allegedly observed through a convex 
rear-view mirror Yanez holding a gun and his hand recoil Iwo limes, w hull IK: ;.il",in 
interpreted as gunfire. R. 183 [96-99,108]. 
As noted in Long, the reliability of Maestas1 observations are undermined because 
an individual's expectations of a situation can cause his memory to fabricate or distort 
details that were not actually observed. 721 P.2d at 489. The human hi .iin does M • based 
on a "series of logical inferences" that are not necessarily accurate in terms of what 
actually happened. Id. Moreover, as time passes between the actual event and trial, the 
mind's inclination to "fill in memory gaps" with lnhtit aial details grows stronger, Id. at 
490. 
Thus, as eyewitnesses wend their way through the criminal justice process, 
their reports of what was seen and heard tend to become "more accurate, 
more complete and less ambiguous" in appearance. The implications of 
this mental strategy for any criminal defendant whose conviction hinges on 
an eyewitness [testimony] are obvious. 
Id. (quotation omitted). Indeed, this deleterious effect is readily apparent in the present 
case; Maestas initially could not provide much detail about the incident, such as whether 
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Yanez held a spray can at the viaduct or whether shots were fired, when he spoke to the 
investigating officer immediately after the incident, R.183[l 12-13], yet he positively 
recalled the details at trial with certainty. 
The accuracy of Maestas' testimony is further skewed by the fact that he made his 
observations in the midst of a flurry of distracting activity. See Long, 721 P.2d at 488 
(distracting activity deleteriously affects accuracy of perception). Maestas testified that 
he saw the Honda approaching him quickly. R. 183[95]. He feared that the man would 
rear-end him so he braked his truck and put it in reverse in anticipation of ramming the 
Honda. R. 183 [96,100]. In the midst of all this, he heard a "pop" and therefore laid down 
in the seat of his truck thinking it was gunfire. R. 183 [97]. The "pop" was muffled 
because only his driver side window was open; his passenger side window was closed. 
R. 183 [98]. Meanwhile, Maestas looked at the distorted image of his convex wide-angle 
rear-view mirror when he allegedly saw Yanez holding the gun and his hand recoiling 
two times. R. 183 [98-99]. As all of this occurred, Maestas was reaching for a pen and 
paper, and copying down the license plate number. R. 183 [104,108]. Given all the 
distractions at the time, "the accuracy of [Maestas1] perception" is questionable. Long, 
721P.2dat488. 
The State presented the testimony of Shell, who alleged that he saw Yanez with a 
gun, saw him follow Maestas, and heard gunshots ring out a few blocks away in the 
direction that they drove. R. 183 [ 120-21,124]. Shell's testimony, however, is too 
improbable and, therefore, does not compellingly corroborate Maestas1 testimony such 
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that the convictions survive the sufficiency challenge. See Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4 at ^ 20. 
Maestas and Shell knew each other for twenty years prior to this incident. R. 183 [104]. 
They spoke of the incident two times before trial. R. 183 [128-29]. Hence, it is more 
probable that Shell's version of the incident was colored and persuaded by that of 
Maestas. 
For instance, Shell and Maestas offered strikingly similar descriptions of Yanezfs 
clothing at trial. Maestas testified that Yanez wore a "gray sweatshirt and cut-off sleeves, 
brown shorts and tennis shoes[,] . . . [l]ong socks clear up in fbc knee . . . [i]rayed around 
the edges of the sweatshirt, hooded sweatshirt." R.183[l 12]. Shell similarly described 
Yanez as wearing "[k]haki shorts with knee-high tube socks and a gray hooded sweatshirt 
cut off at the fringes left in iust strings." R.183[123]. The similarities in 
their testimonies is suspect because Maestas only saw Yanez for fleeting periods nt turn 
as he passed him in his car, and Shell saw so little of him that he originally told the 
investigating officer that he could not provide a description of Yanez at all. R. 183[127-
28]. Likewise, Shell did not report screeching tires oi sqi lealing brakes * rhe 
investigating officers. R. 183[127]. Yet, at trial, he confidently testified that he distinctly 
heard from a few blocks away first the screeching of brakes and then the squealing of 
tires. R. 183 [ 126] He simi IarI v testified with certainty that the pops he heard were 
nothing else but gunfire, and not a backfiring car or firecrackers. R 1831125] 
As a final matter, the conviction for witness tampering in particular fails for 
insufficient evidence since the State presented no evidence that Maestas was "a witness 
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or informant in an official proceeding or investigation" that was underway at the time of 
the alleged offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c); see supra Point LA. (discussing 
why State must show that an actual investigation was underway to prove witness 
tampering). Maestas testified that he was not an informant in this case. R. 183[105-06]. 
The State presented no evidence that he was a witness either. See generally R.183. 
Moreover, there was no evidence that an "official proceeding or investigation" into the 
case had been instituted. Id Indeed, the police were not even notified until after the 
alleged incident occurred. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence as to that element 
of the offense of witness tampering. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c). 
Even if the State did not have to show that Maestas was a witness or informant in 
an actual investigation or proceeding that was underway, but only Yanez1 s subjective 
belief in the same, the witness tampering conviction still fails for insufficient evidence. 
No evidence was presented by the State that Yanez believed an official proceeding was 
underway. See generally R.183. There was no evidence of a verbal communication from 
Maestas to Yanez to the effect of, "I have called the police," "I have contacted the 
authorities," or any other indication that the authorities might be aware of the situation. 
Cf. Bradley, 752 P.2d at 877 (sufficient evidence that defendant believed investigation 
was underway where defendant's business partner was already under investigation for 
crime in which defendant was also a suspect). Moreover, so little time had passed 
between Maestas1 observation of Yanez spray painting graffiti and the chase immediately 
following that one could not reasonably infer that Yanez believed that"an official 
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proceeding or investigation [was] underway" at that point. Cf Tolman, 775 P.2ci at 423-
424 (sufficient evidence that defendant believed investigation was underway where fire 
marshall looked into fire that occurred in May, 1983, and defendant covered up report in 
August, 1983). 
In light of the foregoing, the convictions for witness tampering, possession of a 
firearm by a restricted person, and discharge of a firearm from a vehicle fail for 
insufficient evidence. The evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, is so inconclusive and inherently improbable that a ji ir> 1 in ist 1: lave 
entertained a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Yanez's 
motion to arrest the judgment. 
IV. THE OFFENSES OF WITNESS TAMPERING AND DISCHARGE 
OF A FIREARM MERGE WHERE BOTH CHARGES ARE BASED ON 
THE ACT OF DISCHARGING A FIREARM. 
Assuming for the sake of argument only that the evidence was sufficient to support 
the charges, the trial court erred in denying Yanez's motion to merge the offenses of 
witness tampering and discharge of a firearm because witness tampering could not be 
committed without necessarily committing the act of discharge of a firearm. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(a) (1999) provides: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the 
included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged 
This Court in State v. Ross. 951 P.2d 236 (Utah App. 1997), set forth the 
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constitutional considerations and the analysis regarding merger pursuant to section 76-1-
402(3)(a), stating: 
The prohibition on conviction for lesser-included offenses flows from the 
double jeopardy clauses of the Utah and the United States Constitutions. 
See Utah Const, art. I, § 12 ("[N]or shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense."); U.S. Const, amend. V ("[N]or shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb."). Thus, we interpret section 76-1-402(3) to comply with the 
underlying constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. See City of 
Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1990) 
("[W]hen interpreting statutes, every effort should be made to interpret 
them as being consistent with the dictates of the constitution."). 
Utah courts apply a two-tiered analysis to identify lesser-included offenses. 
See State v. HilL 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983). First we determine whether 
the lesser offense is "established by proof of the same or less than all the 
facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged." Id If 
the two crimes are "'such that the greater cannot be committed without 
necessarily having committed the lesser,1" then the lesser offense merges 
into the greater crime and the State cannot convict and punish the defendant 
for both offenses. Id at 97 (quoting State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152,156 
(Utah 1983)). In most cases, comparison of the statutory elements will 
suffice to determine whether a greater-lesser relationship exists. However, 
where the two crimes have multiple variations, we must look beyond the 
statutory elements and "consider the evidence to determine whether the 
greater-lesser relationship exists between the specific variations of the 
crimes actually proved at trial." Id. at 97. 
Ross, 951 P.2d at 241. 
Case law in Utah and other jurisdictions provides that merger is required where, as 
in the present case, two convictions rest on the same evidence. For example, in Ross, this 
Court held that the offenses of forgery and communications fraud merged where they 
were premised on the transference of one group of checks by the defendant. 951 P.2d at 
245. The Court reasoned that, based on "the evidence, arguments, and instructions at 
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trial, a reasonable jury would have believed it could satisfy both the 'communication1 
element of communications fraud and the 'utterance1 element of forgery by finding that 
defendant transferred the checks to Sanchez." Id 
Likewise, in State v. Williams, 594 P.2d 1281 (Oi \p[> 1979), the Oregon Court 
of Appeals held that the offenses of promoting prostitution and compelling prostitution 
merged because they too were based on the same evidence, which was that defendant 
maintained a place of prostitution and received earnings from a prostitute. Id. at 1284. 
The Court noted that such evidence "directly prove[d] proi i loting pi ostiti ltioi i [and] . . . 
indirectly prove[d] compelling prostitution by being the basis of an inference defendant 
induced the two girls to engage in prostitution." Id, (emphasis omitted). The Court 
placed particular emphasis on the inference that supported the charge of compelling 
prostitution, stating, "[t]he charge of compelling prostitution cam lot be si istained \A ithoi it 
the inferences derived from the evidence that directly proves promoting prostitution." Id.; 
see also State v. Raymer. 662 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Colo. 1983) (aggravated robbery and 
felony murder convictions merged where both offenses were based on evidence that 
defendant caused robbery victim's death during course of robbery); State v. Lass. 777 
P.2d 539, 543 (Wash. App. 1989) (taking motor vehicle without permission merged with 
vehicle prowling where defendant had to unlawfully enter truck in order to take it without 
permission; no additional steps were necessary to completi: b<>th offenses); Howard v. 
State, 762 P.2d 28, 33 (Wyo. 1988) (embezzlement by larceny merged with failure to 
account by public official where both offenses were based on same evidence). 
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The foregoing authority compels the conclusion that discharge of a firearm from a 
vehicle merges into witness tampering. First, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle is 
"'established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of [witness tampering].'" Ross, 951 P.2d at 241 (quoting HilL 674 P.2d at 
97). Moreover, both offenses have "multiple variations" and there is an evidentiary basis 
establishing the "'greater-lesser relationship [] between the specific variations of the 
crimes actually proved at trial.'" Id (quoting HM, 674 P.2d at 97). 
Discharge of a firearm from a vehicle requires that "the actor discharge^ a firearm 
in the direction of any person or persons, knowing or having reason to believe that any 
person may be endangered[, or . . . ] the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, 
discharges a firearm in the direction of any vehicle." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(a) 
& -(2)(c); see also R.87 (Instruction No. 9 - Discharge of a Firearm from a Vehicle). It is 
directly proved by the allegation that Yanez fired a gun "in the direction of [Maestas]" 
and his truck as he followed him. The intent element is proved indirectly by the 
circumstances surrounding the shooting, such as the fact that Maestas observed Yanez 
twice spray painting graffiti and that Yanez seemed agitated by this to the point of 
making hand gestures and following Maestas in his car. 
The witness tampering charge cannot be supported without the inferences drawn 
from the same evidence. See, e.g., Williams, 594 P.2d at 1284 (offenses merged where 
compelling prostitution could only be supported by inferences arising from evidence that 
established promoting prostitution). A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he 
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"communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would believe to be a threat 
to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act performed or to be performed by the 
person in his capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or 
investigation." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c). The State could only establish the 
charge of witness tampering by arguing that Yanez fired a gun at Maestas after Maestas 
saw him spray painting graffiti two times. 
Indeed, the State's closing arguments concerning the two charges are essentially 
the same. Regarding the discharge of a firearm offense, the State asserted: 
We've heard from Robert [Maestas], who said he at least saw - heard one 
shot. And then he was ducking, so he didn't... hear the other two, but he 
could see in his mirror his hand like he was shooting. So we at least know 
of one shot. Matt [Shell] said he heard what sounded like three shots. So 
there was a discharge of a firearm. 
" . . . in the direction of any person or persons knowing or have reason to 
believe that any person may endanger [sic]." Well, if you shoot a firearm 
in the direction of anybody, you can't do that without the belief that you 
might hurt and endanger someone. You don't shoot in the direction of 
people because you think it's safe. 
" . . . or in the direction of any vehicle with the intent to intimidate or 
harass another." He was firing in the direction of Robert's vehicle. And the 
only reason he would be firing it is because of what Robert had seen and he 
was trying to tell him, "Don't mess with me." And we can't climb into the 
defendant's mind; we don't know exactly why he was doing it. But he was 
doing it because it appears to be because of what Robert had seen. Robert 
just wasn't driving by and he just decided to open fire on him. This is 
because of what Robert had seen. 
K.I83[203-04]. 
The State argued in a similar vein the elements of witness tampering: 
We're talking about tampering with a witness here. These are the most 
important elements. 
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That the defendant did communicate to Robert - now it can be verbal or 
physical communication, doesn't have to be spoken words - to Robert 
Maestas a threat that a reasonable person would believe to be a threat to do 
bodily injury. 
If you were shot at, would you take that as a threat that someone wanted 
to do bodily injury to you? Or, number two, if you were coming to a stop 
sign and someone is flying up behind you as fast as they can and you 
believe is going to slam into the back of you, would you believe that to be a 
threat of bodily injury? I even think that a man holding a gun and pointing 
at me like that (demonstrating) is a threat of bodily injury. 
R.183[204-05]. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred in denying Yanez's motion to merge 
the offenses of witness tampering and discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. Discharge 
of a firearm from a vehicle is "'established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of [witness tampering],1" to wit, that Yanez fired a 
gun. Ross, 951 P.2d at 241 (quoting Hill, 674 P.2d at 97). Moreover, this evidence 
establishes the "'greater-lesser relationship [] between the specific variations of the crimes 
actually proved at trial."914 (quoting HiU, 674 P.2d at 97). 
CONCLUSION 
Yanez respectfully requests this court to vacate his convictions for insufficient 
evidence. Alternatively, Yanez requests that this case be remanded for a new trial on the 
basis that the trial court erroneously decided that the State need not show an actual 
investigation or proceeding as required by the witness tampering statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-508(2)(c). Remand for a new trial is also required since the court erred as a 
matter of law in misinstructing the jury that the State need not show an actual 
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investigation or proceeding to establish the offense of witness tampering. Finally, 
remand is appropriate since the trial court erroneously denied Yanez's motion to merge 
the offenses of witness tampering and discharge of a firearm from a vehicle since both 
crimes were established by the same evidence, to wit, the allegation that Yanez fired a 
gun. 
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ADDENDUM A 
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1. DISCHARGING A FIREARM FROM A VEHICLE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/18/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
2. TAMPER W/ WITNESS/JUROR - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/18/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
3. PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/18/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISCHARGING A FIREARM FROM A 
VEHICLE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAMPER W/ WITNESS/JUROR a 
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON 
Page 1 00137 
Case No: 001911531 
Date: Dec 18, 2000 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
ON COUNT 1 - PRISON TERM SHOULD BE 3-5 YEARS, 
Credit is granted for time served. 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
CHARGES TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH EACH OTHER. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $1148.65 
Due: $2500.00 
Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $1148.65 
Total Principal Due: $2500.00 
Plus Interest 
Pay fine to The Court. 
Case No: 001911531 
Date: Dec 18, 2000 
Dated t h i s SL day of &± 
JUDITH/S. AT 
D i s t r i c t CQU 
STAMP USED 
\ 
ECTTCN OF JUDGE 
^ 
ADDENDUM B 
76-8-508. Tampering with witness — Retaliation against 
witness or informant — Bribery — Communicat-
ing a threat. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to 
induce or otherwise cause a person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has 
been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by 
another as a witness or informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of 
his doing any of the acts specified under Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would 
believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act 
performed or to be performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or 
informant in an official proceeding or investigation. 
and ownership of dangerous weapons by certain 
persons. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section 
76-3-203.5; 
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony; 
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 
62A-7-101; or 
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated delinquent for 
an offense which if committed by an adult would have been a violent 
felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5. 
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony; 
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for 
an offense which if committed by an adult would have been a felony; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and 
intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule I controlled sub-
stance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony 
offense; 
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony 
offense; 
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or 
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of the 
United States. 
(2) A Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, 
or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, 
uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same 
time. 
(5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in 
another section for one who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under 
this custody or control any dangerous weapon, the penalties of that section 
control. 
76-10-508. Discharge of firearm from a vehicle, near a 
highway, or in direction of any person, building, 
or vehicle — Penalties. 
(1) (a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or 
firearm: 
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle; 
(ii) from, upon, or across any highway; 
(in) at any road signs placed upon any highways of the state; 
(ivj at any communications equipment or property of public utili-
ties including facilities, lines, poles, or devices of transmission or 
distribution; 
(v) at railroad equipment or facilities including any sign or signal; 
(vi) within Utah State Park buildings, designated camp or picnic 
sites, overlooks, golf courses, boat ramps, and developed beaches; or 
(vii) without written permission to discharge the dangerous 
weapon from the owner or person in charge of the property within 600 
feet of: 
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building; or 
(B) any structure in which a domestic animal is kept or fed, 
including a barn, poultry yard, corral, feeding pen, or stockyard. 
(b) It shall be a defense to any charge for violating this section that the 
person being accused had actual permission of the owner or person in 
charge of the property at the time in question. 
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdemeanor 
imless the actor discharges a firearm under any of the following circumstances 
not amounting to criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which 
case it is a third degree felony and the convicted person shall be sentenced to 
an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison: 
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or 
persons, knowing or having reason to believe that any person may be 
endangered; 
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent 
to damage a habitable structure as defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2), 
discharges a firearm in the direction of any building; or 
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges a 
firearm in the direction of any vehicle. 
(3) This section does not apply to a person: 
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when that person is in lawful 
defense of self or others; or 
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in Sections 23-20-1.5 
and 76-10-523 and as otherwise provided by law. 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent pros-
ecution for offense out of same episode* 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a 
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have 
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty 
by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence 
to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an 
acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a 
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes 
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes 
place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the 
jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of 
prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is 
necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity 
with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the 
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict revers-
ible as a matter of law; or , , 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attobutabie 
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or . 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a tair trial. 
